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Promoting Organic Food: Information Policy versus Production Subsidy 
 
Abstract: 
Governments in developed countries aim to increase the market share of organic products as a 
possibility to improve the environment or animal welfare or as a reaction to food crises and 
changing consumer preferences. Assuming that organic farming creates a positive externality, 
we address the question of how this environmental benefit can be internalized best. We use 
the concepts of heterogeneous producers with different unit production costs and 
heterogeneous consumers with different preferences for conventional and organic food, and 
compare two policy options to enhance organic supply and demand with respect to their 
efficiency and distributional effect: Firstly, we analyze the effect of a supply-side oriented 
policy like a subsidy on organic production on equilibrium prices and quantities, and producer 
and consumer welfare. Secondly, we compare this policy measure with a demand-side 
oriented information policy, which aims to enhance the acceptance and identification of an 
organic label. The main findings of this paper are that in either case, producers and consumers 
of conventional food are worse off, organic producers and consumers experience a gain in 
welfare, but the change in welfare is identical under the two policy options. 
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1 Introduction 
Though still small in absolute terms, organic markets are rapidly growing in developed 
countries. Organic food retail sales in the U.S. were estimated at $7.8 billion in 2000 with an 
average growth rate over the past 10 years of 23% per annum. Industry analysts forecast the 
sector to be worth $20 billion by 2005 (USDA, 2004). The situation is similar to the European 
Union (EU). These increases occur for several reasons: i) Due to increasing incomes and 
repeated food scares consumer preferences for food with specific characteristics increase. ii) 
Spurred by budgetary problems and pressure through international trade agreements some 
countries are trying to get rid of subsidized surplus production by giving incentives to use less 
intensive agricultural production techniques including organic farming. iii) Organic farming is 
promoted as a method to decrease the negative external costs of agricultural production and to 
increase animal welfare. iv) Though not scientifically verified, consumption of organic 
products is sometimes promoted and/or perceived as being healthier.   2
Especially in Europe governments at the national and the EU level are trying to 
promote organic farming. For examples, these days the EU is discussing and developing a 
European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. Similarly, in an answer to the BSE 
crisis in 2001-2002, the German Minister of Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture 
has declared the goal to increase the share of organic products in Germany from 5% today to 
20% in 2010. 
Assuming that such an increase in the market share of organic farming is beneficial to 
society and desired, the question remains how such a goal can be reached most efficiently. To 
partly answer this question is the aim of this paper. In particular, we discuss the efficiency of 
two alternative policies commonly used: the supply-side oriented policy of subsidizing 
organic production (e.g. through agri-environmental programs in the EU, jointly sponsored by 
the European Commission and the member states) versus a demand-side oriented policy of 
public expenditures to promote the consumption of organic products through information and 
advertising. (A good example is the German program “Organic Farming” of the German 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture with a budget of €20 million each 
year between 2001 and 2007.) In this paper we build a theoretical model to compare these two 
alternatives concerning their efficiency and welfare distribution. 
 
2 Basic Model 
  In an attempt to model the welfare effects of these two policy measures on a group of 
heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous producers at the same time we combine two 
models, one described in Giannakas (2002) considering consumer heterogeneity and one 
described in Fulton and Keyowski (1999) considering producer heterogeneity. Since organic 
products can be characterized as credence goods, whose quality can not be evaluated by 
consumers even after consumption (Darby and Karni, 1973), the usual instruments to transfer   3
the credence good into a search good and to circumvent supply-side market failures when 
conventional and organic products are not segregated, is labeling and certification of organic 
food. While Giannakas analyses the benefits of introducing an organic label, we discuss the 
situation where labeling of organic products has been introduced. Therefore, consumers can 
easily detect the credence attributes of the products. Additionally, we assume that there is a 
perfect testing system in place, such that there is no scope for moral hazard or adverse 
selection. Furthermore, we assume that equilibrium prices producers receive equal 
equilibrium prices consumers pay, i.e. marketing margins are zero.
1  In addition, we consider 
that organic production implies a positive externality (or less of a negative externality) 
compared to conventional production. 
 
2.1 Consumers’ decisions 
Assume a group of consumers who are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences 
for organic food. Using the model of vertical product differentiation of Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) and assuming that there are no income effects, indirect utilities associated with 
purchasing on unit of the organic (subscripted by o ) or of the conventional (c) product are 
given by 
(1)  αθ + − = o o p U U  
(2)  βθ + − = c c p U U  
(3)  p U U ~ ~
− =  for  c p U U − >
~
 
U  is a per unit base level of utility, which can be regarded as the willingness to pay for 
conventional food. We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along their 
preferences θ , where  [] 1 , 0 ~ θ . This characteristic θ  differs across consumers and captures 
different willingness to pay for the respective product. Parameters α  and β  are nonnegative   4
utility enhancement factors, which are constant across all consumers. Furthermore, we argue 
that  β α > , i.e. that consumers are more heterogeneous regarding the organic than regarding 
the conventional product. Consequently, the maximum willingness to pay for the conventional 
product is  αθ + U  and  βθ + U  for the organic product. U
~
 is a reservation utility with a 
reservation price of  p ~ . If the indirect utility of either the conventional or the organic product 
falls below this level, consumers drop out of the market and enter the market of a substitute. A 
further assumption is that  p p p c o
~ > >  to capture the fact that prices for organic foods are 
higher than prices for their conventional counterparts due to higher production costs in 
organic farming. Finally, we assume that  c p U U − >
~
 (i.e. if  ) 0 = θ ,  p pc
~ − > β  and 
c o p p − > α  to allow for positive shares of organic and conventional demand. Graphically, 
this model is illustrated in figure 1.  
  Assuming utility maximization along the differentiating attribute θ , the share of 










by equating indirect utilities (3) and (2). The marginal consumer located at  1 θ  is indifferent 
between consuming the conventional product or leaving the market for a substitute. For 
mathematical simplicity, let  β α λ − = . The total share of the substitute plus the conventional 
demand is found by equating (2) and (1), which yields 
(5)  2 θ
λ
=
− c o p p
. 
Likewise, the consumer located at  2 θ  is indifferent between demanding the conventional 
product or its organic counterpart. Demand for the conventional product is derived by 
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2.2 Producers’ decisions 
We assume heterogeneity of producers by introducing a differentiating attribute ϕ , by 
which we comprise factors which affect average production costs. Again, let producers be 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e.  [ ] 1 , 0 ~ ϕ , where  0 = ϕ  denotes low average 
production costs and  1 = ϕ  high average production costs. The profit functions for unit 
productions of the respective products are given by 
(8)  () γϕ + − = Π o o o c p  
(9)  () δϕ + − = Π c c c c p  
(10)  0 ≥ − = Π n n n c p  
o c  and  c c  are the base level costs of producing the organic or the conventional product, 
respectively. To capture higher production costs in organic farming, which include the costs 
of labeling, certification and monitoring as well, let  c o c c > . We further assume that γ  and δ  
are nonnegative cost enhancement factors and that  γ δ > . By this we argue that producers of 
conventional food are more sensitive to factors like soil quality, climate, etc. and require 
factors like synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, etc., which are not permitted in organic 
production. For positive shares, let  ( ) n o o c p Π − − > γ  and  ( ) n c c c p Π − − > δ .  n Π  is the profit 
level of an alternative product, which is definitely not a substitute in consumption. If the 
profits of organic production along the differentiating attribute ϕ  fall below the constant level   6
of  n π , producers drop out of this market and produce something different, yielding a profit of 
n π . Graphically, producers’ decisions are illustrated in figure 2. 
  For the subsequent equations let  γ δ µ − = . Assuming profit maximization along the 
differentiating attribute ϕ , supply of the conventional product is found by equating (8) and 
(9), which yields 
(11)  () () S
c
o o c c x






with the marginal producer located at  1 ϕ  being indifferent between producing conventional or 
organic food. The total market share of conventional and organic production is given by 





Π − − n o o c p
 
2 ϕ  is the location of the producer who is indifferent between producing organic or an 
alternative product. Subtracting (11) from (12) gives organic supply 
(13)  () ( ) S
o
c c n o o x
c p c p
=
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ϕ2 1.  
 
2.3 Market Equilibrium 
  Assuming autarky and, hence, equal shares of supply and demand, we calculate 
equilibrium prices by equating (11) and (6) for the conventional market and (13) and (7) for 
































































































Thus, the equation for equilibrium prices reads 
(17)  Ce A p
1 * − =  








− + − Π −
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c c p p
. 
 
Comparative static analysis reveals that the organic equilibrium price is positively related to 
the reservation price  p ~ , basic organic production costs  o c  and the profit of the alternative 




































































Referring to the nonnegative enhancement factors, the organic equilibrium price is positively 
related to the organic utility enhancement factor α  and the organic cost enhancement factor 
γ , and negatively related to the conventional utility enhancement factor β  and the 





























Conversely, the conventional equilibrium price is positively related to all enhancement factors 






























This implies that the greater the difference in heterogeneity of consumers subject to the 
product that maximizes their utility, the more organic prices increase and conventional prices 
decrease, causing the organic premium to rise. To put it the other way round, the less people 
differ in their preferences for organic food, the more the difference between organic and 
conventional prices converges to almost zero and the more consumers leave organic markets 










































Looking at the supply side, the comparative static analysis shows that an increase in 
the cost factor for conventional production (e.g. due to decreasing soil quality) reduces the   9
difference between organic and conventional prices and induces further farmers to convert to 
organic farming. This theoretical finding is in line with the empirical evidence that more land 










































Finally, the total share of organic and conventional market taken together increases with an 
increase in the difference of heterogeneity of consumers and decreases with an increase in the 
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This means that a greater heterogeneity of organic consumers induces some consumers to 
leave the market for the substitute and enter the market for the conventional product, but they 
cannot fully offset the exit of conventional consumers to the organic market. A greater 
heterogeneity of conventional producers leads to producers dropping out of the organic 
market and producing the alternative product, while the loss in organic producers is more than 
offset by conventional producers entering the organic market. Selected comparative static 
results are summarized in table 1. 
 
2.4 Consumer and Producer Welfare and Externalities 
Without any externality in production or consumption the resulting market equilibrium 
of the organic and the conventional product is the first best solution for a closed economy and 
no government intervention is desirable. Consumer welfare is given by area abcd in figure 1 
covering the welfare of consumers of conventional products ( c CW ) and the colored area bcef 
covering the welfare of consumers of organic products ( o CW ). Producer welfare is given by   10
ABCD in figure 2 covering the welfare of conventional farmers ( c PW ) and the colored area 
CBEF covering the welfare of organic farmers ( o PW ). The respective welfare functions are 
given below: 
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ϕ
− − − − = − − = ∫ o o o o o c p d c p PW  









− − = − − =∫ c c c c c c p d c p PW  
However, there is some empirical evidence that organic production is environmental friendlier 
compared to conventional production (Dabbert et al. 2000). These difference in externalities 
between organic and conventional farming can be modeled either as conventional farming 
creating a negative externality that does not occur with organic production or as organic 
farming creating a positive externality that does not occur with conventional production. 
Following the later and assuming that the positive externality per unit of organic production is 
a constant (B ), the social profit curve  ( ) B c p o o o + + − = Π γϕ
*  lies above private profits in 
figure 2 and social benefits of organic farming (without internalization) is area CEGH in 
figure 2. Mathematically, the environmental benefit is given by 
(24)  ) ( 1 2 ϕ ϕ − = B EBo  
Given the positive externality,  2 1 2 1 θ ϕ ϕ − = −  is no longer the optimal market share of 
organic products. Social supply of organic products is 
(25)  ( ) ( ) EB S
o
c c n o o EB EB x








ϕ ϕ    11
with the loss in producer welfare due to the positive external effect covering area JCEI in 
figure 2. 
This gives the usual rational for government intervention in form of subsidies or 
promotion of organic products. In the following we compare a subsidy on organic production 
that fully internalizes the positive externality with an information policy aimed at increasing 
the utility consumers derive from consumption of organic products and thus increasing the 
share of organic food by exactly the same amount as in the case of the subsidy. 
 
3 Subsidy on organic production 
In this policy scenario it is assumed that the regulator knows the exact amount of the 
environmental benefit corresponding to each unit of the organic product produced and places 
a subsidy of the same (constant) amount on organic production, in the following denoted by 
E . 
Thus, the profit function if a unit of the organic food is produced is 




o + + − = Π γϕ , 
with all other profit and indirect utility functions ((1)-(3) and (9)-(10)) left unchanged and the 
new equilibrium prices denoted by 
S
o p  and 
S
c p , respectively. Now, the supply function for the 
conventional product is given by 







E c p c p ,
1 = =




organic supply by 







c p E c p , =
− − Π − + − +
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γ µ γ µ
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E c p , =
− Π + + −
γ
γ
.   12
Equating supply and demand, matrix 
S A  remains unchanged (see (15)) and the parameters 
corresponding to E  will be implemented into matrix 
S C . The resulting equilibrium prices 
with a subsidy for organic production and calculated as  ( )
S S S S e C A p
1 *, − =  are given by 
(30) 
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c c E p p
. 
Partial derivatives of prices and quantities with respect to the subsidy E  shows that a subsidy 
for organic production reduces both the organic and conventional price, increases the organic 





































The corresponding welfare functions are 
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− − = − − = ∫    13
Differentiating the consumer welfare functions with respect to prices and producer welfare 
functions with respect to the subsidy shows, that both, organic producers and consumers 




























4 Information policy 
The aim of the information policy is to increase the identification and acceptance of 
the label, which indicates the credence attributes of the (organic) product. The economics 
literature distinguishes between persuasive and informative advertising. We believe that this 
kind of information policy belongs to the latter category by arguing that not any specific kind 
of agricultural product is advertised but simply the existence of a certain label promoted. We 
emphasize that the economic effect can be interpreted as reduced search costs for consumers 
demanding organic products (see for example Nelson, 1970, and Butters, 1977). This 
assumption implies, similar to the results of Giannakas (2002) regarding mislabeling of 
organic products, that labeling per se is a necessary, but still an insufficient mean in 
transferring a credence good into a search good.  
Since any kind of economic modeling of an information policy (or advertising in 
general) is very critical (see, for example, the discussion in Cardon and Pope, 2003), we 
demonstrate two alternatives: First, we assume that consumers with a higher differentiating 
attribute  θ  are more sensitive to any information regarding organic products and, 
consequently, experience a higher utility enhancement. This will cause the  o U  curve to rotate 
upwards at  0 = θ  by a certain amount and, thus, increases the willingness to pay for the 
organic product. Alternatively, it might be argued, that all consumers reached by the 
information policy experience a higher utility enhancement irrespective of their θ , causing   14
the  o U  curve to shift upwards. For simplicity, let us assume that all consumers located along 
θ  are reached by the information policy with equal probability and that the probability of 
getting the information equals the probability of actually deriving a utility enhancement, 
which leads to effective demand, provided that consumers are located at a high enough θ . For 
comparative static purposes we assume that the information policy aims to internalize the 
positive external effect inherent in organic food production by increasing the organic share by 
the same amount as in the previous analysis with a subsidy on organic production in place. 
 
4.1 Rotation of  o U  
As an option to model the effect of the information policy on organic food demand, let 
the utility enhancement be subject to the location of the consumer along the differentiating 
attribute and thus entering her indirect utility function in a multiplicative manner: 




o p U U  
with 
I
o p  being the new equilibrium price for the organic products. α  is simply increased by 
ε  and causes the  o U  function to rotate counter-clockwise around the point 
I
o p U −  at  0 = θ . 
All other utility functions, as well as the profit functions on the supply side remain unchanged 
as in the basic model, except for prices changing to 
I
o p  and 
I
c p . Hence, conventional and 
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The new equilibrium prices due to the resulting position of the 
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The situation is equal to the comparative static analysis outlined in the basic model. 
Here we assume that the utility enhancement factor α  for organic consumers increases by ε . 



















For the new organic market share to equal the organic market share as if a subsidy were in 
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o p p p
*, * *, > >  with the difference between 
I
o p
*,  and 
S
o p
*,  being equal to E , the subsidy for 
organic production. Therefore, organic and conventional producer welfare equals the 
respective welfare of the subsidy scenario. There is no difference between conventional   16
consumer welfare either, only consumers of organic food experience an increase in their 
welfare due to the counter-clockwise rotation of 
I
o U . 
The resulting welfare functions due to the information policy are: 





















+ − − = + + − = ∫  




2 1 2 2
2
1










θ θ θ βθ
θ
θ
− + − − = + − = ∫  

















c p d c p PW ϕ ϕ
γ
ϕ ϕ ϕ γϕ
ϕ
ϕ
− − − − = − − = ∫  




















∫ − − = − − =  
 
4.2 Shift of  o U  
The second option to model the effect of the information policy on organic food 
demand is to assume that any utility enhancement by reduced searched costs enters the 
consumer’s organic utility function in an additive way and causes the function to shift 
upwards by ρ : 
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with new equilibrium prices 
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Taking the first derivatives of the prices with respect to the shift parameter ρ  shows 
that any utility enhancement of a constant amount for all organic consumers increases organic 


















Again, for the new organic market share to equal the organic market share as if a 
subsidy were in place, 
II
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For completeness, the new organic consumer welfare function is given by 

















θ ρ θ αθ ρ
θ
− + − + − = + + − = ∫  
All other welfare functions are the same as in the previous section with indices changed. 
Given the new equilibrium prices as outlined above, organic and conventional producer 
welfare, as well as organic and conventional consumer welfare is equal to the policy scenario 
with a subsidy on organic production. 
   18
5 Conclusion 
In many developed economies, organic markets are rapidly growing for several 
reasons, such as such as increasing incomes, repeated food scares, pressure through 
international trade agreements, environmental benefits of organic production, and the 
perception of organic food as being healthier. Especially in Europe governments at the 
national and the EU level are trying to promote organic farming, either by subsidizing organic 
production or by promoting organic food aimed at raising the acceptance and identification of 
organic food labels. 
Similar to Fulton and Giannakas (2004), we combine two models, one with consumers 
having heterogeneous preferences and one with heterogeneous producers facing different unit 
production costs. Assuming that organic food production creates positive externalities, for 
example in regard to environment or landscape, we analyze the effect of two policy measures 
to fully internalize this positive externality on the welfare of producers and consumers: a 
subsidy as a constant amount of the environmental benefit per unit of the organic product 
produced and an information policy aimed at enhancing the acceptance and identification of 
the label on organic food and thereby raising consumers’ indirect utilities. 
Using a numerical example, the main findings of the theoretical model are summarized 
in table 2: A subsidy on organic production lowers both, conventional and organic 
equilibrium prices, increases the share of organic production and consumption and, thus, 
lowers conventional production and consumption. Welfare of organic producers and 
consumers is thereby enhanced, while welfare of conventional producers and consumers is 
lowered. Referring to the information policy, we present two different ways of the effect of 
promotional activities with respect to the organic label on indirect utility functions. Assuming 
that this kind of informative advertising reduces search costs for consumers to identify 
organic food, consumers with high preferences for organic food might experience a higher 
utility enhancement than consumers with lower preferences, and, thus, causes the organic   19
indirect utility curve to rotate upwards. Alternatively, one might assume that the information 
policy enhances utility for all consumers of an equal amount, which will cause the utility 
curve to shift upwards. In either case, the resulting equilibrium prices and quantities appear to 
be the same. In contrast to the subsidy, the information policy increases organic equilibrium 
prices with the difference to organic equilibrium prices of the subsidy scenario being the 
monetary value of the environmental benefit of organic per unit production. Conventional 
equilibrium prices are lowered, but at the same level as the respective price with a subsidy on 
production in place. Consequently, the welfare effect of a subsidy compared with that of an 
information policy is the same, except for a higher organic consumer welfare if their indirect 
utility curve rotates upwards than shifts. 
The model does not specify a total welfare function due to the fact that the direct 
comparison of the monetary value of a subsidy with the costs of advertising expenditures per 
unit demanded is left to speculation and does not allow any comparative static analysis 
between a subsidy versus an information policy. Government expenditures in the case of a 
subsidy are given by the subsidy (i.e. the monetary value of the environmental benefit) times 
the units of the organic product produced. Since the information policy takes the form of 
random advertising, public expenditures are, however, subject to the probability of consumers 
of getting reached, subject to unit costs of transferring the information to the final consumer 
and subject to the intensity to affect consumers’ utility in a certain manner (see, for example, 
the model in Butters, 1977). Seeing this, it becomes clear that total welfare will likely be 
different under the policy options analyzed. However, any detailed specification of the 
expenditure function, combined with the introduction of probabilities in organic indirect 
utility functions, will at least not change the quantitative nature of the model with producer 
and consumer welfare remaining the same as if a subsidy on the supply side were in place. 
   20
                                                 
Footnote 
1 The analysis can easily be extended by introducing positive marketing margins of constant 
proportions to the wholesale or retail level without changing the qualitative nature of the 
model (see Fulton and Giannakas, 2004). However, this assumes the existence of a perfectly 
competitive processing industry and the absence of market power of retailers.   21
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Figure 1: Consumers’ decisions 
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Note: Table entries indicate the direction of the change that occurs 
in the endogenous variable for a positive change in the exogenous 
variable 
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Table 2: Effect of organic food policies on prices, quantities and welfare 
Exogenous parameters
20,00
8,00   organic: Supply/Demand 0,23 Supply/Demand 0,31 Supply/Demand 0,31 Supply/Demand 0,31
4,00   conventional: Supply/Demand 0,64 Supply/Demand 0,58 Supply/Demand 0,58 Supply/Demand 0,58
3,00   sum: 0,87 0,89 0,89 0,89
6,00
4,00   equilibrium prices: 10,61 10,18 10,68 10,68
3,00 7,52 7,43 7,43 7,43
8,00
3,00   welfare: 3,78 5,16 5,20 5,16
0,00 9,13 8,24 8,24 8,24
0,50 0,08 0,15 0,15 0,15
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